We introduce a model of strategic environmental policy where two …rms compete à la Cournot in a third market under the presence of multiple pollutants. Two types of pollutants are introduced, a local and a transboundary one. The regulator can only control local pollution as transboundary pollution is regulated internationally. The strategic e¤ect present in the original literature is also replicated in this setup. However, we illustrate that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of tradable emission permits instead of non-tradable ones then a new strategic e¤ect appears which had not been identi…ed thus far. In this case, local pollution increases further and welfare is lowered. We also provide evidence from the implementation of EU ETS over the pollution of P M 10 and P M 2:5 :
Introduction
There is a consensus among theorists, policymakers, and practitioners regarding the necessity to promote cooperation among individual countries to combat climate change and, in general, any international environmental problem in which a prisoner's dilemma situation applies. In practice the problem is complex due to the fact that concerns about competitiveness and carbon leakage co-exist. Despite the obstacles, small steps have been taken but a great deal still remains to be done. Many countries have signed the Kyoto protocol and other regional agreements that aim to …ght transboundary pollution problems (United Nations, 1998). In December 2014 in the Lima United Nations conference, negotiators representing over 190 countries elaborated the elements of the new agreement, scheduled to be agreed upon in Paris in late 2015. 1 The intended national contributions will form the foundation for climate action post-2020 when the new agreement will be launched (United Nations, 2014).
In the speci…c context of curbing CO 2 emissions, most countries have put their faith in a combination of emission taxes, quotas, and tradable emission permits. Nonetheless, the optimal mode and level of regulation are debatable. 2 Moreover, who should bear the burden of environmental regulation is also questionable. Policymakers have expressed severe concerns regarding the loss of competitiveness as many …rms are sensitive to environmental regulation and are thus footlose.
Indeed, several European countries have been implementing carbon policies since the 1990s, and at the same time they have granted various forms of rebates to energy-intensive …rms. A speci…c form of rebates is the free allocation of permits. For example, the European Commission decided to exempt from permit auctions the carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries (Martin et al., 2014; Meunier et al., 2014) . 3 Following the prescription of cooperation many international programs have now been implemented regarding the regulation of CO 2 . The most well-known example is the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) for CO 2 emissions which covers more than 11,000 power stations and manufacturing plants in the 28 EU member states as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. In total, the EU ETS limits around 45% of the total emissions in the participating countries (European Commission, 2013).
In reality CO 2 and other transboundary pollutants co-exist with other pollutants which a¤ect the environment locally (or they are transboundary pollutants of a shorter range). Similarly to CO 2 regulation the governments tend to establish agreements for the local pollutants. To this end, di¤erent policy instruments have been used in various cases. An example is the 1999 Gothenburg protocol that de…nes national emission ceilings for a number of pollutants. The protocol came into force on May 17, 2005 following two main provisions. Annex I determines the critical loads and levels and then Annex II sets emission ceilings for 2010 for four polluntants: sulphur, NOx, VOCs, and ammonia, while it was amended in 2012 to include national emission reduction commitments that should be achieved by 2020 and beyond (United Nations, 1999). Interestingly, a severe form of local pollutants that adversely a¤ect human health-particulate matters (both P M 10 and P M 2:5 )-were not included in the initial amendments. The latter has been included in the revised version of the protocol signed in Geneva in May 2012 and de…nes emission reduction commitments for P M 10 and P M 2:5 for 2020 and beyond, which are expressed as a percentage reduction from the 2005 emission level.
However, apart from the European air quality standards, EU individual governments are responsible for their own air quality policy and legislation. For example, the Environment Agency in the UK regulates the release of pollutants into the atmosphere that come from large and complex industrial processes. They also decide on the emissions generated from large-scale food processing factories and pig and poultry rearing activities. The Environment Agency works with local authories in England and Wales and their strategy sets air pollution standards in order to protect the environment, as well as people's health.
Our Contribution: The current paper aims to contribute in several directions. We establish a tractable analytical model where we assume that transboundary pollution is regulated internationally, while regulators control local pollution. More speci…cally, in a two-country, two-pollutants framework, we assume that local pollution is regulated through the use of emission standards, while for the transboundary pollution we examine two alternative policy instruments: non-tradable and tradable permits. These scenarios are consistent with the EU alternative regulations schemes; before and after the introduction of tradable permits in 2005. In this context, we aim to study whether local regulator-governments have an incentive to set more lenient environmental regulation in order to control local pollution so as to promote the exporting activity of polluting …rms. The second objective is to examine whether the magnitude of this strategic incentive depends on the environmental policy instrument implemented for the regulation of the transboundary pollutant.
Our results suggest that there indeed exists a strategic e¤ect in the multiple pollutants case.
The most important …nding, however, is that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of tradable permits then a regulator has a stronger incentive to relax regulation regarding local pollution compared to the case where transboundary pollution is controlled through the use of command and control. This implies that a stronger strategic distortion exists because of the presence of tradable permits which exacerbates the previously existing prisoner's dilemma. Put di¤erently, we identify a channel which if not considered can lead to welfare losses. In the case where the permit price appears to be relatively high then its use may lead to a welfare improvement in this setup. 4 To support our theoretical results we then focus on several export sectors in the EU 28 countries that have participated in the EU ETS launched in 2005 and we observe that local pollution as expressed by concentrations of P M 10 and P M 2:5 , which, as discussed above, has been under the discretion of local regulators, initially increased, while both in non-export sectors and in sectors that are not participating in the EU ETS, the corresponding concentrations have decreased over time. To illustrate this, we provide some statistics that show the trend of the above local pollutants during the period 1990-2012 in the EU 28, which is then compared with the trend of the CO 2 in the same period.
The exemption of P M 10 and P M 2:5 pollutants from the Gothenburg protocol provides us with the opportunity to isolate the e¤ect that we are interested in. As our theoretical predictions and the anecdotal evidence seem to converge on the fact that regulation for these local pollutants was relaxed immediately after the imposition of the EU ETS, new policy implications arise. We caution that when governments are concerned about the competitiveness of their exporting sectors and sign agreements regarding international environmental problems they should not overlook the regulation of local pollutants.
Related Literature: The environmental policy as a means to a¤ect the competitiveness of the regulated sectors has been well studied in the 'Strategic Environmental Policy'or 'Ecological Dumping' literature, established, among others, by Conrad (1993) , Barrett (1994) , Kennedy (1994) , Rauscher (1994), Ulph (1996) , and Neary (2006) . A common suggestion in the latter literature is that governments engaging in international competition have a unilateral incentive to set the environmental regulation below the …rst-best level when their representative …rms compete à la Cournot in world commodity markets in order to enhance their pro…ts and maximize national welfare. 5 As a result a race to the bottom occurs, which is detrimental for welfare. 6 Although very informative, these models assume that there exists only a single pollutant, local or transboundary. In reality, as previously discussed, many pollutants co-exist at the same time and their cleaning-abatement costs are characterized by economies or diseconomies of scope. In particular, if joint abatement creates synergies then the pollutants are considered as complements in the abatement process, while in the opposite case they are considered as substitutes. 7 The linkages arising in the presence of multiple pollutants, especially from a theoretical point of view, have been underinvestigated. Ambec and Coria (2013) analyze a mix of tax and permit policies under uncertainty and determine the optimal policy depending on the substitutability or complementarity 5 Empirical …ndings by Levinson and Taylor (2008) , Ederington et al. (2005) and Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) attest this strategic interaction. 6 Hamilton and Requate (2004) argue that when vertical contracts are allowed the optimal policy corresponds to the Pigouvian tax regardless of the mode of competition. In addition, Antoniou et al. (2013) show that the race to the bottom described in the strategic environmental policy literature may even be reversed if the two exporting countries are linked through a permits market. 7 These potential synergies are often captured in studies as 'ancillary'bene…ts from the reduction of other pollutants (e.g., Burtraw et al., 2003; Groosman et al., 2011 and Finus and Rübbelke, 2013) .
The interested reader may …nd several examples of substitutability or complementarity of pollutants in studies by Sigman (1996) 
4
of pollutants. Another signi…cant theoretical contribution is the study by Moslener and Requate (2007) which derives the optimal abatement strategies in a dynamic multi-pollutant model. Such dynamic considerations are, however, orthogonal to the issues we address and our model therefore abstracts from those ones.
Our paper is a natural extension of the Strategic Environmental Policy literature under the presence of multiple pollutants. Our …ndings are in line with the current stream of the literature on the sign of the strategic e¤ect. The added value of our results is that we illustrate how the presence of permits trading further enforce the strategic motive and may thus lead to lower welfare. 8 A recent work by Fullerton and Karney (2014) , in a completely di¤erent framework, also stresses that the implementation of di¤erent policy instruments may yield di¤erent outcomes and highlights the necessity of joint regulation in the presence of multiple pollutants. An interesting feature identi…ed in our study, missing from the existing theoretical papers, is the correlation of the abatement costs of di¤erent pollutants not only through the presence of synergies but also through an indirect channel; that is, the regulation of one pollutant a¤ects output and this directly a¤ects the abatement costs of the other pollutant. 9 Organization of the paper : In section 2 the theoretical model is introduced. Then, in section 3 the comparative statics of the model are presented and, in section 4, the welfare analysis follows. In section 5 an application to the EU ETS is discussed. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
All proofs of the corresponding lemma and propositions are relegated to an appendix.
The Model
Consider, initially, a symmetric two-country, home and foreign, two-stage game. Each country is represented by a government and an exporting …rm. When …rms produce they emit two di¤erent pollutants, a local and a global one. The global pollutant is regulated through an international agreement which implies that the governments are not ‡exible regarding the regulation of this pollutant. The timing structure is as follows:
The governments move simultaneously and individually select regulation for the local pollutant, while for the global one they are restricted by an international agreement.
Stage 2:
The …rms compete à la Cournot in the world commodity market.
Since the focus of the analysis is on strategic trade, we further assume that consumption of the goods in the two countries is zero, thus total production by the two …rms is exported to the rest of the world (ROW). Production for the domestic …rm is denoted by x, and the production cost, without loss of generality, is normalized to zero. 10 Total revenue is r(x; X), and we assume that 8 In a di¤erent setup Caplan and Emilson (2005) show that the use of permits both for a global and a local pollutant may lead to a Pareto superior welfare outcome. Moreover, Emilson and Zhu (2009) show that in the presence of multiple pollutants the pollution haven hypothesis is veri…ed despite the presence of a permits market for the global pollutant. 9 Holland (2012) in a di¤erent model also de…nes an output e¤ect, which is unrelated to ours. Holland (2012) introduces pollution as an input and the output e¤ect follows from the changes in the corresponding price of pollution. On the contrary, we model pollution as a public bad. d(e 1 ; e 2 + E 2 + P n j=1 e j ), where e j denotes transboundary pollution from sector j, whereas
0. These conditions simply state that the damage is increasing and convex with respect to pollution. When the last two conditions are satis…ed with equality the damage of pollution is separable across the two pollutants.
Following the relevant literature (Ambec and Coria, 2013) we allow each …rm to have private abatement technology (a i ) for each pollutant, which allows adherence to the binding level of regulation set by the governments. Should the international agreement on the global pollution allow …rms to trade permits they can increase pollution if they purchase permits from the permits market. For example, the home …rm can increase (reduce) emissions above (below) e 2 , if it buys (sells) pollution permits from (to) its rival at a given price P e , determined in the competitive permits market. The …rm may decide to sell (purchase) an amount e 2 > 0 (< 0) of (over) its initially allocated permits e 2 , and thus reduce (increase) its emissions by e 2 . Given the possibility to trade permits, abatement for each pollutant is a i = i x e i + (e i ) 0. Note that for the local pollutant, permits trading is not allowed. The abatement cost is as follows:
The total abatement cost functions consist of two components. The …rst one is the sum of the direct cost of reducing emissions by a i units for i = 1; 2. For this term we assume that ac ia i (a i ) > 0 and ac ia i a i (a i ) > 0. Put di¤erently, the abatement cost is increasing and convex. The last component of the abatement cost function captures the possible spillovers across abatement levels for the two di¤erent pollutants. When < 0 they are complements, while when > 0 they are substitutes in the cost functions. Thus, complementarity (substitutability) implies that for all abatement levels a 1 > 0 and a 2 > 0; the cost of joint abatement is lower (higher) than the cost of reducing the emissions of each pollutant separately. These synergies resemble the economies of scope in production resulting from producers mergers. In addition, we need to assume that ac xx (a i ; a i ) 0 which implies
. This assumption implies that the marginal costs with respect to output should be constant or increasing. Pro…ts are de…ned as:
Since in the two countries there is no consumption of the good, the changes in consumer surplus are captured exclusively by the changes in the damage function. Welfare in the home country is letters. Since the two …rms (countries) in the main case are assumed to be symmetric, we only present the explicit variables and functions of the home …rm (country).
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de…ned by: 11
We solve the problem backwards. Each …rm maximizes its pro…ts with respect to output, the corresponding abatement levels, and the number of permits it is willing to trade. Therefore, the maximizing problem of the …rm is the following:
The …rst-order conditions for the two …rms are:
e 2 ac e 2 ( ) = 0
The second-order conditions are satis…ed since xx < 0, e 2 e 2 < 0 ,
xe 2 > 0 and
> 0. Moreover, xX < 0 and xX < 0 ensure that the output reaction functions are downward sloping and are a strategic substitutability of outputs.
In the set of equations given by (3) we assume that
= 0 which implies that the …rms act as price takers in the thick permits market. Indeed, the EU ETS scheme includes almost half of the EU's CO 2 emissions from 11,000 installations across all 28 member states. 12 The equilibrium permit price, P e , is the one that clears the permits market, that is,
where " j stands for the sales of permits of …rms belonging to di¤erent sectors in the common permits market.
Comparative Statics
In this section we …rst present the results regarding the strategic e¤ect in a general mode and then introduce a linear speci…cation in order to go through the details of some extreme cases.
1 1 For simplicity it is assumed that permits are grandfathered to the …rms so that welfare does not depend directly on permit revenues. This is consistent with the distribution mechanism adopted in the EU ETS during the …rst two phases. 
General Results
We examine the decisions made in stage 2 of the game and attain the comparative statics of a fully symmetric international duopoly. The comparative statics analysis focuses on the sign of the so-called 'strategic e¤ect'that appears in eco-dumping models and leads to the prisoner's dilemma.
The strategic e¤ect can be described as the e¤ect that home's environmental regulation has on the foreign …rm's stage 2 equilibrium output, i.e.,
, where stars denote stage 2 equilibrium values. In models of standard strategic environmental policy with a unique pollutant the sign of each derivative separately is unambiguously negative. That is, an increase in the number of permits by one country lowers the marginal cost of abatement, and thus raises local output. The other country's output falls due to the reaction function of output. As in the current study we want to focus on a new strategic motive present due to the existence of the permits market for the transboundary pollutant, we need to distinguish between two alternative scenarios regarding the regulation of transboundary pollution:
Scenario 1 (NT) Transboundary pollution is regulated through the allocation of a …xed number of permits to each …rm.
Scenario 2 (T)
Transboundary pollution is regulated through the allocation of a …xed number of permits to each …rm and the allowance to trade internationally.
Both scenarios above introduce a command and control approach for regulation with the di¤er-ence being that in the second scenario …rms are more ‡exible in the pollution they can emit since they can exchange permits. In order to make our point clear and comparable we assume that under both scenarios the regulator allocates the same amount of …xed permits. Everything being equal isolates the new strategic motive created by the presence of permit trading.
Since the regulators in the two countries are restricted by the international agreement regarding transboundary pollution they only have limited degree of freedom which translates to a unique choice variable, that is e 1 and E 1 respectively. The …rst necessary step toward our results is to determine of the strategic e¤ect @X @e 1 in the two di¤erent scenarios and compare its magnitude. The following proposition summarizes this:
From Proposition 1 (a) we observe that when command and control is used for regulating the transboundary pollutant the outcome is ambiguous and depends on the degree of complementarity.
In particular, when the pollutants are substitutes in the cost functions ( > 0) or independent ( = 0) the strategic e¤ect is always negative. Relaxing regulation of the local pollutant tends to decrease local marginal abatement costs and thus increase output. This in turn increases the abatement costs of the global pollutant. This is not su¢ cient to invert the sign of the strategic e¤ect from negative to positive (see = 0). When > 0 the reduction of the aggregate marginal abatement costs is stronger because of the spillovers. When, however, the pollutants are complements ( < 0) then 8 the strategic e¤ect is weakened for a relatively low degree of complementarity in absolute values.
In case where this value equals the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant, c 1xx ( ), the strategic e¤ect is zero. In this particular case, there is no incentive for the regulator to distort regulation regarding the local pollutant as the lower marginal costs are then o¤set by the spillover e¤ect. If the degree of complementarity exceeds this level then the strategic e¤ect turns out to be positive. That is, the indirect e¤ect attributed to the spillovers may exceed the negative direct e¤ect on local marginal abatement costs following from a laxer standard. Therefore, in the presence of more than one pollutant it can be the case that the governments have an incentive to tighten regulation in order to enhance competitiveness, which is not possible under the standard eco-dumping models with a single pollutant (e.g., Barrett, 1994) .
Another implication which follows from the proof for the sign of the strategic e¤ect, yet is intuitively straightforward, is that without spillovers, when the slope of the direct marginal abatement cost for the transboundary pollutant (c 2xx ) is in…nite then the strategic e¤ect tends to be zero.
This describes a situation where there is no abatement technology available for the transboundary pollutant. Therefore, relaxing the local emission standard cannot increase production since production must adhere to the binding level of transboundary emissions.
Regarding the case where tradable permits are used instead of command and control, i.e., Proposition 1 (b), we infer that the sign of the strategic e¤ect is also ambiguous. In particular, when the degree of complementarity or substitutability does not exceed in absolute value the squared root of the product of the slopes of the direct marginal abatement costs of the local and the global pollutant, i.e., 2 ( 1 ; 1 ), where 1 = p c 1xx c 2xx ; the strategic e¤ect has a negative sign. Put di¤erently, a government has an incentive to relax environmental policy for the local pollutant for strategic purposes as long as the spillovers are rather low in any direction. If this is not the case then the strategic e¤ect can be zero or can even turn out to be positive. The spillovers tend to mitigate the strategic e¤ect, as the …rm responds to changes in local pollution in two ways.
First, it adjusts output in a similar way as in the non-tradable permits case and, second, decides on the volume of permit trading. The latter is determined from the restriction that the marginal abatement costs of the transboundary pollutant are …xed at the international permits price. As departs from zero the volume of permit trading adjusts such that the aggregate marginal costs increase relative to the case where = 0.
To provide a clear comparison of the two scenarios under study, we need to compare the slopes of the marginal abatement cost of the local and the transboundary pollutants. This comparison leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (a) If the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant is higher than the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant, i.e., c 1xx > c 2xx ; then the sign of the strategic e¤ ect
; where i = N T; T; is as follows:
If the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant is lower than the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant, i.e., c 1xx < c 2xx ; then the sign of the strategic e¤ ect is:
From Corollary 1(a) we observe that when the two pollutants are complements and the degree of complementarity is 2 ( c 1xx ; 1 ), the strategic e¤ect is negative under emission standards and positive under tradable permits. Put di¤erently, for a relatively high degree of complementarity the incentive to relax regulation for strategic purposes appears only when a government implements non-tradable permits as a means of regulation. The opposite is true in the case where the slope of the marginal abatement cost of the local pollutant is lower than the corresponding slope of the transboundary pollutant, and the degree of complemetarity 2 ( 1 ; c 1xx ) (Corollary 1(b) ). In this case the incentive to relax regulation for strategic purposes is present only when a government imposes tradable permits to deal with the global pollutant. The intuition for this follows directly from the mechanics previously presented.
Another obvious di¤erence between the two modes of regulation is that in the tradable permits case the strategic e¤ect can be positive even in the case where the pollutants are substitutes. That is, the domestic government relaxes local pollution and this results in lower domestic production.
When the degree of substitutability is su¢ ciently high a possible relaxation of the standard over the local pollutant decreases the direct marginal abatement cost but this results in a proportionally higher increase in total marginal costs, which in turn leads to a total decrease in output. This is due to the presence of a competitive permits market which invalidates the direct e¤ect of regulation on marginal costs through the spillovers. Another di¤erence between the two scenarios is obtained when there is no abatement technology available for the transboundary pollutant and at the same time no spillover e¤ects exist. Contrary to scenario 1, now, the strategic e¤ect remains negative since the …rm can always buy permits from the permits market and skate over the previously binding levels of emissions.
Most likely, at least for intermediate values of , in both scenarios the strategic e¤ect is negative.
Therefore, even if an agreement is reached regarding the transboundary pollutant, there is an incentive to disregard the local pollutant. The results of Proposition 1 extend and generalize the major results of the strategic environmental policy literature under multiple pollutants. From a welfare analysis perspective it is worth comparing the two alternative scenarios after introducing multiple pollutants. Doing so we obtain interesting results that cannot be anticipated at …rst sight.
The following proposition compares the strategic e¤ects in the two cases: Proposition 2 Given that the stage 2 equilibrium outputs are the same across the two scenarios then for j j " it follows that
Proposition 2 is very important as it provides a ranking of the strategic e¤ects across the two scenarios and this in turn is the driving force for the welfare analysis to follow. Stage 2 equilibrium outputs are set at the same level so that the two strategic e¤ects are comparable. This is redundant for any linear demand function and quadratic abatement cost function, which are the usual assumptions introduced in the relevant literature as the level of the strategic e¤ect is independent from the output level. Proposition 2 implies that, for a given equilibrium, if the government in the home country relaxes the emission standard for the local pollutant then there is a reduction in the foreign …rm's output more in the case where the transboundary pollution is regulated through a permits market rather than the use of emission standards. Therefore, the strategic motive is higher in the …rst case.
The rationale is as follows. When transboundary pollution is regulated through non-tradable permits then a higher level of local pollution decreases the marginal abatement costs and production tends to rise. Following this, marginal abatement costs of the global pollutant increase as the …rm must abate more and this in turn reduces the magnitude of the initial e¤ect. The component of the abatement costs that corresponds to the global pollutant acts as an automatic stabilizer. On the contrary, when tradable permits are implemented the increase in output following the higher standard for local pollution does not increase the marginal abatement costs of the global pollutant as these are …xed at the international permits price.
Combining Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 we obtain an interesting implication. Since the strategic e¤ect is higher in the non-tradable permits case (Proposition 2) and for > 1 the strategic e¤ect in the tradable permits case turns positive, then by continuity there must exist a 2 (0; 1 ) for which the values of the two strategic e¤ects are equalized. For a degree of spillovers larger than the ranking of the strategic e¤ects reverses its order.
Robustness: The Role of under a Linear Speci…cation
Here, we introduce a linear speci…cation of the model to examine in detail what happens when the spillovers are signi…cant. In the linear speci…cation case we introduce explicit functional forms.
In particular, we assume a linear inverse-demand function as P = B b (x + X) and a quadratic abatement cost function as ac(a i ; a i ) =
Note that B is the demand intercept, b > 0 the slope of the inverse demand and g i the slope of each direct marginal abatement cost, while all the rest is the same as in the benchmark model. Replacing these functions in the corresponding formulas we get the strategic e¤ects in the two scenarios as follows:
Comparing the two e¤ects in (5) we obtain the following proposition:
Generally interpreted, Proposition 3 states that for moderate values of the results presented thus far are not altered. In particular, the di¤erence in the strategic e¤ects under tradable and non-tradable permits is always negative as long as the degree of complementarity does not exceed in absolute terms the slope of any of the two direct marginal abatement costs. When the degree of spillovers is rather small there are two e¤ects following a laxer local standard a¤ecting the level of the strategic e¤ect. The direct marginal abatement cost is reduced but the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant tends to increase when standards are used while it is zero when permits are implemented. Since in any scenario the …rst e¤ect is stronger than the latter the result is a decrease in total marginal abatement costs. Therefore, the domestic …rm's output tends to increase. Contrary to that, when tradable permits are implemented, the increase in output as a response to the relaxed policy for the domestic pollutant does not have secondary e¤ects through the marginal abatement costs of the transboundary pollutant because these are tied down by the permits price. In this case, no automatic stabilizers are present, which implies that the strategic e¤ect is even more negative. Due to the fact that the indirect e¤ect tends to increase the total marginal abatement costs in scenario 1, the strategic e¤ect is greater compared to scenario 2.
When the two pollutants are complements, or the degree of substitutability is relatively low, the ordering of the strategic e¤ects in the two scenarios does not change. The spillover e¤ect tends to a¤ect the di¤erence between the two strategic e¤ects because in the tradable permits case the …rm reacts to the policy change through its decision regarding permits, reducing the magnitude of the e¤ect of the change in regulation over the overall marginal abatement costs. For intermediate values of the ordering of the strategic e¤ects does not change as the e¤ects described above prevail. When the degree of substitutability, however, takes relatively high values, i.e., > this ordering is reversed. Now, if the domestic regulator relaxes regulation for the local pollutant then foreign output decreases more under scenario 1 compared to scenario 2. In this case the regulator's incentive to relax local regulation in order to gain a market share is dampened when tradable permits are implemented.
Welfare E¤ects
So far we have analyzed the sign of the strategic e¤ects in the two scenarios and their relative magnitude. In the original eco-dumping literature the presence of the strategic e¤ect in both exporting countries is detrimental for welfare. Both countries are involved in a prisoner's dilemma where both exporters produce too much output and emit too much pollution. Therefore, we shall expect that the higher this e¤ect in absolute terms the higher the welfare losses.
To set this formally we introduce the welfare maximization problem of the regulator in the home country. In order to make the results of the two scenarios comparable and abstract from any other e¤ects we need to assume that the level of the transboundary pollution is exactly the same across the two scenarios. 13 = 0, i = N T; T .
The second-order condition is satis…ed from concavity. Applying the envelope theorem, the terms in the parenthesis are equal to zero. The third e¤ect corresponds to the decrease in abatement costs when regulation is relaxed, while the next one indicates how the strategic e¤ect a¤ects pro…ts. The last term denotes the bene…ts from regulation. In a context where the regulator uses environmental policy only to deal with the externality, i.e., non-strategically (N S), the …rst-order condition is reduced to the Pigouvian rule where the marginal cost of abatement should be equal to the level of the marginal damage,
. When, however, the regulator acts strategically (S), a bias in favor of laxer regulation appears due to the strategic e¤ect. As a result a government has an incentive to increase local pollution for trade purposes, i.e., (e 1 ) S > (e 1 ) N S .
Given the previous assumption that the level of transboundary pollution is the same across the two scenarios it follows that, ceteris paribus, in the absence of the strategic e¤ect the two scenarios in terms of welfare are equivalent. That is, the permits price and the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant must be equal. This marks a benchmark point in order to focus on the strategic e¤ect and its implications for welfare. The following lemma compares the two scenarios in terms of pollution in equilibrium:
Lemma 1 Given the equivalence of pollution across the two scenarios, when the governments act non-strategically and Proposition 2, then in the strategic game equilibrium pollution is higher in scenario 2 compared to scenario 1.
Lemma 1 states that the presence of a permits market for the transboundary pollutant leads to higher pollution as a result of laxer regulation compared to the case where that pollutant is controlled directly through command and control. This implies that equilibrium outputs will be higher. This result is expected to hold true for any spillover as long as the ranking of the strategic e¤ects does not change. A direct implication of Lemma 1 is the following proposition which provides a welfare ranking across the two alternative policy scenarios:
The resulting equilibrium welfare under scenario 2 is lower than the corresponding one of scenario 1 for j j ", i.e., w S T < w S N T that the cooperative solution in the tradable permits case leads to higher welfare compared to the non-tradable permits case. Therefore, a supranational regulator would have an incentive to reduce pollution further because the total marginal abatement cost is higher now due to the fact that the permit price is …xed at the Pigouvian level. The resulting welfare, however, is now higher because stricter regulation tends to reduce the marginal abatement cost of the transboundary pollutant and the …rms become permit sellers.
Moving to the right from the non-strategic regulation level, in Figure 1 , the ranking of aggregate welfare levels across the two scenarios is reversed. As is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 the critical point is to determine that at the non-strategic node the slope of the joint welfare function is larger in absolute terms in the tradable permits case compared to the non-tradable permits one.
This combined with Lemma 1 implies that relaxing regulation decreases aggregate welfare less under scenario 1 vis-à-vis scenario 2. That is, an increase of aggregate pollution decreases relatively more the total marginal abatement cost in scenario 2 which leads to excess competition among …rms and lower pro…ts. In addition to that, the …rms must pay in order to buy the corresponding number of permits. Using the resulting strategic e¤ects from Proposition 3, we infer that the non-cooperative equilibrium under scenario 2 implies higher pollution compared to scenario 1. Therefore, aggregate welfare is clearly lower in scenario 2 and, due to symmetry, the same holds for each country's welfare.
From the analysis above a ranking of the equilibrium pollution levels and the equilibrium welfare levels follows immediately:
Corollary 2 For moderate values of ; i.e., j j < "; the ranking of equilibrium pollution and welfare levels is: (e + E) C < (e + E) N S < (e + E) S and (w + W ) C > (w + W ) N S > (w + W ) S under both senarios.
The comparison of the equilibrium welfare levels shows that even though the government has an incentive to impose lax environmental regulation for the local pollutant in order to improve competitiveness, this instrument leads to a Pareto inferior outcome in terms of welfare. These outcomes are a natural extension of the results provided by Ulph (1996) for the multiple pollutants case and the intuition follows along the same lines.
Changes in the Permit Price
The analysis and the discussion of our results regarding welfare are based on the fact that the two scenarios are equivalent in terms of welfare when the two governments act non-strategically. For this to be true, it is implicitly assumed that the permit price adjusts accordingly. However, it is not necessary to believe that this is indeed true in a complex world. In reality this would require perfect information and knowledge of all markets and their interrelations such that the designers issue the proper number of permits. Therefore, it is worth considering what the implications are and how the results of Proposition 4 change as we agitate the permit price away from the one that corresponds to the non-strategic case, i.e., P e 6 = P eN S .
To do so we introduce Figure 2 which summarizes the results based on a linear variation of our model. The two solid curves simply replicate the previous analysis. The two dashed curves represent two alternative cases where the permit price is di¤erent to the one that corresponds to the non-strategic case. In particular, for a higher permit price, i.e., P e > P eN S , aggregate welfare under scenario 2 shifts upwards for every level of aggregate emissions. On the contrary, aggregate welfare is lower when P e < P eN S . Though a higher permit price increases the total marginal abatement costs of the …rm, aggregate welfare is higher because the …rms increase their abatement level and pro…tably sell permits to the other sectors, while at the same time competition is softened. Hence, a double dividend is present for the …rms, which results in higher pro…ts. The opposite happens when permit prices decline. That is, a lower permit price reduces total marginal abatement costs and thus …rms tend to increase production. The …rms purchase permits which results in tighter competition and lower pro…ts.
Given these, it follows that when P e > P eN S then scenario 2 may welfare dominate scenario 1. Despite the fact that under scenario 2 regulation is too lax due to the stronger strategic e¤ect Figure 2 : Aggregate welfare levels under tradable and non-tradable permits: Changes in permits price relative to scenario 1, the positive e¤ect of the higher permit price may outweigh the negative e¤ect created by the race to the bottom. However, it must be noted that the higher the permit price is, the stricter the level of regulation and vice-versa. On the other hand, when P e < P eN S , scenario 2 is clearly detrimental for welfare compared to scenario 1 since the lower permit price is supportive of the existing negative strategic e¤ect. Given that in the EU emissions trading scheme permit prices were very low we may conjecture that the introduction of tradable permits was indeed welfare reducing.
The EU ETS and Local Pollution
In this section we aim to exploit the data provided from the survey of the European Environment it is useful to identify the participating sectors. In Figure 3 it can be observed that most of the allowances were distributed to electricity producers and combustion industries, followed by iron and steel, cement, and re…neries.
From the analysis of the previous section it follows that the level of permit prices also plays a key role in determining the optimal level of local pollution. In particular, our calculations for the linear speci…cation suggest that the permit price and local pollution are negatively related when the spillovers are relatively small. In reality, however, regulation regarding local pollution rarely adjusts, while permit prices are highly volatile and vary on a daily basis. The reader can view our theoretical results from a long-term perspective. In Figure 4 we introduce the graph regarding the evolution of permit prices. Two di¤erent lines are represented since allowances are traded in future markets where promises must be ful…lled at di¤erent time periods. The price of permits was at relatively high levels in 2005 while thereafter for the next two years it followed a decrease. In 2008 the price increased again to a level close to the 2005 levels.
Toward the end of that period the permit price dropped, once more opening a discussion within the EU commission as to whether to withdraw a signi…cant amount of permits. As published in the Financial Times on January 24, 2013 (see Clark et al., 2013) : "Connie Hedegaard, the EU climate commissioner, said the price collapse should serve as a '…nal wake-up call'for both member states and the parliament.'The recent events show that something has to be done urgently', she said, and urged support for a proposal to postpone auctions of 900m carbon permits while discussions get under way on a more fundamental …x." A temporary withdrawal was indeed approved. However, the e¤ectiveness of this measure on permit prices remains questionable. According to our theoretical results a higher permit price results in higher welfare as exporting …rms coordinate on lower production levels while simultaneously earning windfall pro…ts from permit trading. Therefore, our policy prescriptions sourcing from the theoretical model are fully aligned with the intentions of the 
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to explore how environmental regulations could be used as an alternative tool to promote exports. More speci…cally, we use a model of strategic environmental policy with multiple pollutants, where the two …rms compete à la Cournot in a third market.
We assume the existence of two pollutants, a local and a transboundary one. The transboundary pollutant is controlled at an international level, while the local pollutant is regulated unilaterally.
The focus question is whether the policy targeting the local pollutant could be used as a means to promote the exports of the competing …rms under the assumption that transboundary pollution is set internationally. Our conclusion is in any case a¢ rmative.
Our …ndings show that when transboundary pollution is regulated through the use of emission permits then the regulator has a stronger incentive to relax the regulation regarding local pollution, compared to the case where command and control is implemented for the reduction of transboundary pollution. This indicates a new strategic distortion due to tradable permits that leads to welfare losses. We also show that this result could be reversed in the case of a higher permit price. In this context, the higher permit price may outweigh the negative e¤ect of the 'race to the bottom,' which in turn implies higher welfare levels. Similarly to regulation through emission permits, when emission taxes are implemented the marginal abatement costs are …xed to the given tax, and thus we expect that all the implications presented for the emission permits scenario will also carry over when the regulator selects the emission taxes to regulate local pollution.
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The data extracted from the survey of the European Environmental Agency at the industry level for the EU 28 over the period 1990-2012 support our …ndings. More precisely, we observe that export-oriented sectors that participate in the EU Emission Trading System increased the generation of local pollutants around the period of the enforcement of the trading scheme, while this trend was followed by a gradual adjustment during the following years. This inverted U in the pattern of local pollutants is not observed in the sectors that either do not have signi…cant exporting activities or do not participate in the European permits market. Moreover, CO 2 emissions remained constant when the EU ETS was introduced and thereafter followed a decreasing pattern for the majority of the sectors under study.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 a) In order to determine this sign of
we can di¤erentiate the pro…t maximizing conditions of the …rms with respect to outputs and solve for the comparative statics:
where N T = xx XX xX Xx is the determinant of the Hessian matrix and the condition for stability implies N T > 0 (Dastidar, 2000) . Note that Xx < 0 and xe 1 = ac xe 1 ( ) = +c 1xe 1 ( ) = + c 1xx ( ) R 0: Thus, the overall sign depends on the sign of xe 1 : 
where T H F e 2 e 2 Xx xX E 2 E 2 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix. Following Bulow et al. (1985) in order to ensure stability of the equilibrium, the Hessian matrix must be negative de…nite which implies that T > 0: Moreover, the conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium in 24 this setup are satis…ed as long as ac xx (a i ; a i ) 0 (see Meunier, 2011) . We know that Xx E 2 E 2 > 0 and remains to determine the sign of xe 1 e 2 e 2 e 2 x = 2 c 1xx ( )c 2xx ( ). We de…ne as Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
In order to obtain and compare the sign of the strategic e¤ect under the two senarios (N T; T ), we need to compare the di¤erent levels of the degree of compementarity derived in Proposition 1.
More speci…cally, if c 1xx < 1 ) c 1xx < p c 1xx c 2xx ) (c 1xx ) 2 > (c 1xx c 2xx ) ) c 1xx > c 2xx : ; for > 1 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
When = 0 it is trivial to show that the strategic e¤ect in scenario 2 can be expressed either by the formula in (A2) or by the formula in (A1) given that the last two …rst order conditions in 
Proof of Proposition 3
Taking the di¤erence of the two strategic e¤ects in (5) we get: where ! 3b 2 g 2 (g 1 g 2 2 )(4bg 2 + g 2 2 + 3g 2 + 2 + g 1 (2g 2 + )) . For < 0, given that j j < g 1 ; g 2 it follows directly that ! < 0 ) 
Proof of Proposition 4
De…ne as aggregate welfare the sum of welfare levels in the two countries for each scenario: . Therefore, e c 1 < e 1 where the index stands for pollution in the aggregate case. For values of pollution which are higher than e c 1 it follows that 
